


2016 SGPC Annual Conference  
2016/09/29 Paris


Welcome... in the bunker where internet  
started!

**Denis Kessler**  
CEO, SCOR SE

# Acts of God, Acts of Man, Acts of the Devil: The risk universe is expanding



# Early this morning, a regular day on the internet



| ATTACK ORIGINS |               | ATTACK TYPES |                    | ATTACK TARGETS |                      | LIVE ATTACKS |   |                 |               |                    |              |      |
|----------------|---------------|--------------|--------------------|----------------|----------------------|--------------|---|-----------------|---------------|--------------------|--------------|------|
| #              | COUNTRY       | #            | PORT SERVICE TYPE  | #              | COUNTRY              | TIMESTAMP    | ATTACKER  | ATTACKER IP     | ATTACKER GEO  | TARGET GEO         | ATTACK TYPE  | PORT |
| 8              | United States | 5            | 25 smtp            | 11             | United States        | 08-31-20.100 | Public Allocation                                   | 49.213.41.54    | Ahmedabad, IN | San Francisco, US  | telnet       | 23   |
| 5              | Pakistan      | 5            | 53413 netis-router | 6              | France               | 08-31-19.877 | Linode LLC  | 106.187.102.237 | Tokyo, JP     | San Francisco, US  | vcom-tunnel  | 8001 |
| 2              | China         | 5            | 23 telnet          | 5              | United Arab Emirates | 08-31-19.411 | This Ip Network is Used For Internet Security Re... | 185.35.62.53    | Geneve, CH    | Chennevieres-S...  | ntp          | 123  |
| 1              | Netherlands   | 1            | 8001 vcom-tunnel   | 1              | Italy                | 08-31-18.824 | Customers Procono                                   | 212.225.151.16  | Cordoba, ES   | Dubai, AE          | microsoft-ds | 445  |
| 1              | Japan         | 1            | 8123 unknown       |                |                      | 08-31-18.692 | Microsoft Corporation                               | 157.56.111.246  | Redmond, US   | De Kalb Junctio... | smtp         | 25   |
| 1              | Italy         | 1            | 123 ntp            |                |                      | 08-31-18.357 | Carinet Inc.  | 209.126.136.2   | San Diego, US | Lynnwood, US       | domain       | 53   |
| 1              | India         | 1            | 3389 ms-wbt-server |                |                      | 08-31-17.970 | Chinanet Hubei Province Network                     | 116.211.0.90    | Wuhan, CN     | Dubai, AE          | unknown      | 8123 |
| 1              | Spain         | 1            | 445 microsoft-ds   |                |                      | 08-31-17.642 | Fuse Internet Access - Bras Evendale Region         | 74.215.214.149  | Mason, US     | Dubai, AE          | telnet       | 23   |



- HOME
- EXPLORE
- WHY NORSE?



## > ATTACK ORIGINS

### || ▶ COUNTRY

- 3 China
- 3 Saudi Arabia



## > ATTACK TARGETS

### || ▶ COUNTRY

- United States
- 3 Saudi Arabia

## > LIVE ATTACKS

| TIMESTAMP              | ATTACKER ORGANIZATION          | LOCATION       | IP            | TARGET LOCATION          | TYPE SERVICE | PORT |
|------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------|---------------|--------------------------|--------------|------|
| 2015-12-25 15:03:17.30 | Beijing Hsoft Technologies Inc | Beijing, China | 115.47.24.220 | Roseville, United States | rtp          | 123  |
| 2015-12-25 15:03:17.30 | Beijing Hsoft Technologies Inc | Beijing, China | 115.47.24.220 | Roseville, United States | rtp          | 123  |
| 2015-12-25 15:03:17.30 | Beijing Hsoft Technologies Inc | Beijing, China | 115.47.24.220 | Roseville, United States | rtp          | 123  |
| 2015-12-25 15:03:17.30 | Beijing Hsoft Technologies Inc | Beijing, China | 115.47.24.220 | Roseville, United States | rtp          | 123  |
| 2015-12-25 15:03:17.30 | Beijing Hsoft Technologies Inc | Beijing, China | 115.47.24.220 | Roseville, United States | rtp          | 123  |
| 2015-12-25 15:03:17.33 | Beijing Hsoft Technologies Inc | Beijing, China | 115.47.24.220 | Roseville, United States | rtp          | 123  |
| 2015-12-25 15:03:17.33 | Beijing Hsoft Technologies Inc | Beijing, China | 115.47.24.220 | Roseville, United States | rtp          | 123  |
| 2015-12-25 15:03:17.33 | Beijing Hsoft Technologies Inc | Beijing, China | 115.47.24.220 | Roseville, United States | rtp          | 123  |
| 2015-12-25 15:03:17.34 | Beijing Hsoft Technologies Inc | Beijing, China | 115.47.24.220 | Roseville, United States | rtp          | 123  |


## > ATTACK TYPES

### || 5 SERVICE PORT

- 3 rtp 123
- 1 ssh 22
- 1 netbios-dgm 138
- 1 liberty-lm 496
- 1 nd-l-aas 3128
- 1 unknown 32412
- 1 unknown 32414

- 
- 
- 1 The Cyberspace – A man-made environment that has deeply transformed the society and the economy**
  - 2 Cyber Risk characteristics - So present and so unknown
  - 3 How do I think about Cyber as CEO of a reinsurance company?

## The Cyberspace started here!



*SCOR building in 1944*

### 29, rue la Pérouse

- During World War II, this place was known as as the German Signal Blockhouse
- After Liberation, the 805th US Army Signals Detachment installed SIGSALY, a 50 tons voice encryption system for direct encrypted links to London and Washington



*This Auditorium, with a SIGSALY terminal in 1945*

# Cyberspace: A man-made environment inherently vulnerable

- ❑ Cyberspace is a man-made environment created in the late 60's
- ❑ Security was not a primary concern


September 1981

Internet Protocol  
Introduction

The Options provide for control functions needed or useful in some situations but unnecessary for the most common communications. The options include provisions for timestamps, security, and special routing.

*Internet Protocol Definition (1981): security is an unnecessary option*

- ❑ First « virus »: 1988, the Morris Worm
  - Infected 10% of the Internet
  - US Government Accountability Office estimated damages at \$100 000 - \$ 10 000 000



A portion of Internet routes by The Opte Project

# Cyberspace has deeply transformed the society and the economy

- ❑ In less than 60 years, digital technologies have deeply transformed our societies
- ❑ The global economy benefits from digitalization
  - Traditional business sectors transformed by digital innovations (e.g. banking)
  - New business sectors have emerged (e.g. online gaming – market volume of \$35B in 2013 and forecast of \$56B in 2018)
  - Growth of intangible assets (volume & value)




Social Networks



Connected Health




Connected Cities



Connected Cars


# Digitalization creates new vulnerabilities

- ❑ The value of intangible assets is increasing
  - Branding, reputation
  - Intellectual Property (e.g. Defense, Pharma)




Source: National Vulnerability Database

- ❑ The attack surface is growing:
  - Connected objects (e.g. cars, planes, power stations)
  - Connected services (e.g. mobile banking, tax payment)



# Since Internet inception, cyber threats have constantly increased

- 1 The era of viruses
- 2 The era of military & State sponsorship
- 3 The era of Cyber Crime




☐ Attackers are well organized

☐ Efficient defenses are difficult to implement

- 
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# Cyber risks are recent and developing very fast

- ❑ Only 25/30 years, with little historical data
  - No regular reporting on cyber breaches
  - No organization empowered to collect, anonymize and build statistics with cyber breach data
- ❑ However, initiatives are being implemented in the US, the UK, France...
  - US Dept. of Homeland Security: Cyber Information Sharing and Collaboration Program
  - UK Cyber-security Information Sharing Partnership
  - FR Law on critical infrastructure protection



Evolution of Cyber threats, BAE System Applied Intelligence



# Cyber risks are pervasive

## Cyber has consequences on all risks and all business lines

|  |   |   |
|--|---|---|
| <i>Business interruption</i>                 | <i>Contingent business interruption</i> | <i>Data and software loss</i>               |
| <i>Cyber ransom and extortion</i>            | <i>Intellectual property theft</i>      | <i>Incident response cost</i>               |
| <i>Network Security</i>                      | <i>Reputational damage</i>              | <i>Regulatory &amp; Legal Defense costs</i> |
| <i>Communication and media misuse</i>        | <i>Legal protection</i>                 | <i>Assistance coverage</i>                  |
| <i>Claims against Directors and Officers</i> | <i>Environmental damages</i>            | <i>Physical asset damage</i>                |
| <i>Financial theft and/or Fraud</i>          | <i>Breach of privacy</i>                | <i>Bodily injury and death</i>              |

*CRO Forum Concept Paper on a proposed categorization methodology for cyber risk*

## And yet there is very little certainty on these consequences

- ❑ Invisible and delayed effects
  - Most cyber attacks have no physical consequences
  - Median number of day before detection: 229
  - Cyber attacks can be anonymously performed from anywhere
- ❑ Sophisticated cyber attacks are stealthy (cyber espionage) and difficult to detect until it is too late.
- ❑ 66% of cyber attacks are discovered by external parties.
- ❑ A risk without borders: no frontiers, no specific business sectors, no size are immune to cyber risks - all organizations are exposed, everywhere.

# Cyber risk has severe impacts

## Financial impact



*Other Banks may have been affected*

**SWIFT**, the financial network

**2015:** Hackers stole **\$12m** from Ecuador's Banco del Austro

**Feb. 2016:** Hackers stole **\$81m** from Bangladesh national bank

## Impact on infrastructure




**December 2015:** A carefully designed cyber attack caused a power outage in Ukraine. 3-6h of black-out impacting 80.000 homes

*The black-out was short because technicians were able to switch back to manual mode and restore power*

## Impact on reputation and governance

Shares of Target have lagged those of its larger rival Wal-Mart.



- Target's share price drops after 40m credit card numbers and 70m personal information stolen by hackers in 2013
- CEO Fired


*While both lines trace the difficulties in the retail sector the separation observed illustrates just how damaging a cyber event can be.*




# As interconnections and digitalization increase, are « cyber catastrophes » more likely?

## Which scenarios for a cyber catastrophe?

- ❑ Cyber risks has high impact and likelihood, above terrorist attacks and not so far away from large scale involuntary migration!
  - WW concentration of IT providers (Microsoft Windows market share: 90%)
  - Massively and increasingly interconnectedness
- ❑ Catastrophes could result of attackers targeting
  - Core systems (SWIFT, Oracle, Google...)
  - Key infrastructures
  - Key databases



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# What keeps me awake at night?

## Key expectations

## How can SCOR manage its exposure to cyber risk?

|                 |  |   |
|-----------------|--|---|
| Clients         | Clients expect SCOR to protect their critical data   | Know and monitor SCOR's cyber exposure and cyber breach scenarios   |
| Regulators      | Regulators have strong requirements on personal data security  | Ensure cyber protection means are commensurate with the threat  |
| Investors       | Investors expect SCOR to efficiently protect against cyber attacks causing operational or reputational damages | Implement a high and identical level of protection across SCOR Group and efficient business continuity planning |
| Rating agencies | Rating agencies expect SCOR to have a very strong cyber operational risk management                            | Ensure that SCOR is ready to deal with a cyber crisis. Adequate investments to update protection systems        |

## Who is driving the decision?



Source: Lloyd's cyber survey report – Aug 2016



September 13<sup>th</sup>, 2016 - New York Governor Andrew Cuomo on Tuesday issued long-anticipated proposed **cyber security regulations for banks and insurers in the state**, the first of their kind in the United States by any state or federal agency, the governor said in a statement.

# SCOR's exposure to cyber risk is well managed



## SCOR consistently improves its Cybersecurity

- Already in 2012, SCOR started a major program to enhance its cyber security: the “Data Protection Program”
- SCOR produces a Cyber Risk dashboard, shared with the Risk Committee of the Board

SCOR  
Group Risk Management Dashboard  
Quarterly Report for Risk Committee – 2016 Q2  
CONFIDENTIAL – CYBER RISK DASHBOARD (1/2) (p.19/20)  
© July, 2016

| Type of Cyber Risk                       | Main Scenario  | Impact on Critical Assets |           |             |       | Level of threat (1-4) | Pre-Event Probability of occurrence (1-4) | Post-Event Probability of occurrence (1-4) | Residual Risk Level (1-4) |
|--|--|---------------------------|-----------|-------------|-------|-----------------------|---|--|---------------------------|
|  |  | Reputation                | Financial | Operational | Legal |                       |   |  |                           |
| Targeted computer systems (1)            | A1 Unauthorised access to its back-end systems   | ✓                         | ✓         | ✓           | ✓     | 3                     | 3   | 3  | 3                         |
|  | A1a Client web services (Customer/HR) or website   | ✓                         | ✓         | ✓           | ✓     | 3                     | 3   | 3  | 3                         |
|  | A1b Business critical data (Core SCOR operational)   | ✓                         | ✓         | ✓           | ✓     | 3                     | 3   | 3  | 3                         |
|  | A1c Non-ITK systems (external client)  | ✓                         | ✓         | ✓           | ✓     | 3                     | 3   | 3  | 3                         |
|  | A1d Access to non-critical data to avoid financial services attack   | ✓                         | ✓         | ✓           | ✓     | 3                     | 3   | 3  | 3                         |
| Information leakage (2)                  | A2 The SCOR web site is defaced  | ✓                         | ✓         | ✓           | ✓     | 3                     | 3   | 3  | 3                         |
|  | A3 Intellectual property   | ✓                         | ✓         | ✓           | ✓     | 3                     | 3   | 3  | 3                         |
|  | A3a External activity  | ✓                         | ✓         | ✓           | ✓     | 3                     | 3   | 3  | 3                         |
| Malware (Malicious computer program) (3) | A4 Network, third sponsored hosting, operations on other probability or socially networked resources                                     | ✓                         | ✓         | ✓           | ✓     | 3                     | 3   | 3  | 3                         |
|  | A4a Infection of malware on critical operational servers   | ✓                         | ✓         | ✓           | ✓     | 3                     | 3   | 3  | 3                         |
|  | A4b Access to the Shared User (SCOR system)  | ✓                         | ✓         | ✓           | ✓     | 3                     | 3   | 3  | 3                         |
|  | A4c Non-ITK systems (external client)  | ✓                         | ✓         | ✓           | ✓     | 3                     | 3   | 3  | 3                         |
|  | A4d Large infection of workstations with malware   | ✓                         | ✓         | ✓           | ✓     | 3                     | 3   | 3  | 3                         |
| Information leaks (4)                    | A5 Implementation of a new system not tested by a 3rd party/external developer   | ✓                         | ✓         | ✓           | ✓     | 3                     | 3   | 3  | 3                         |
|  | A5a Publishing attack leads to leak of corporate data  | ✓                         | ✓         | ✓           | ✓     | 3                     | 3   | 3  | 3                         |
| Information leaks (5)                    | A6 Malicious media containing sensitive data (penetration, backdoors, IPsec, USB drives, portable disks, etc.) is stored on SCOR network | ✓                         | ✓         | ✓           | ✓     | 3                     | 3   | 3  | 3                         |



## Cyber Protection Systems

- SCOR has implemented systems and security tools meeting financial sector standards
- In addition to this, SCOR's IT network is continuously controlled by a *Security Operation Center* under CIO's responsibility



## SCOR is protected by Cyber insurance cover

- Depending on the type of event affecting SCOR's data and systems, the insurance program covers SCOR's own damages, third party liability and costs and services related to crisis management

# Challenges have to be met to benefit from the (re)insurance growth opportunity that cyber represents

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## Opportunities

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- ✓ Become an actor of the fast growing (re)insurance market
- ✓ Bring tangible solutions to clients
- ✓ Leverage digitalization to enhance SCOR's operations
- ✓ Improve knowledge of intangible risks

## Challenges to overcome

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- Need to raise cyber expertise in the market
- Improve Risk Management process & quality of information provided to risk carriers
- Collect data & Build risk models
- Manage risk aggregation and exposure to Cyber Cat